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Abstract:
This paper shows that, if countries are farsighted when deciding whether to defect
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ing in higher global emissions and lower global welfare. We further show that the
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mented, the more likely that the above mechanism unfolds. We examine a reduction
in the emission per output ratio as well as measures that enhance the natural rate
of decay of stock pollutants.
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1 Introduction
This paper examines the stability of international agreements on emission reductions
of a transboundary pollutant when the countries involved implement "cleaner" tech-
nologies that reduce emission-output ratios. We also show that measures to increase
the natural rate of absorption of stock pollutants have qualitatively similar e¤ects
on the stability of international agreements on emission reductions.
This topic gains importance in light of the large expenditures that have been
made in recent years for creating cleaner technologies. In February, 2002, the US
announced a policy for climate change that would rely on domestic, voluntary actions
to reduce the greenhouse gas intensity(ratio of emissions to economic output) of
the U.S. economy by 18% over the next 10 years. Since then other major polluters
such as China and India have also committed to emission per output targets and
investment in clean technologies worldwide has consistently risen. In 2007 alone,
new investment in clean energy rose by 60% above the 2006 level globally (UNEP
Report, 2008).1
We focus on those cases of transboundary pollution that a¤ect a small number
1The G8 summit held in July 2009 included a commitment by the members to double public
investment in the research and development of climate-friendly technologies by 2015. The agreement
at the COP16 meeting held in Cancun in December 2010 includes a "Green Climate Fund," proposed
to be worth $100 billion a year by 2020, to assist poorer countries in mitigating emissions, partially
by nancing investments in clean technologies (UNFCCC Press Release, 11 December 2010).
Countries that have channelled their government spending to this end include the US (e.g. the
introduction of the Investing to Modernize the Production of American Clean Energy and Technol-
ogy (IMPACT) Act of 2012 to provide incentives for clean energy and to repeal fossil fuel subsidies
for big oil companies). The EU has also, in 2009, declared that e105 billion will be invested in the
"green economy" through the EU Cohesion Policy (more than 30% of the regional policy budget
for 2007-2013). Over the last ve years, China has also increased its renewable energy generation
to 8.8% of total primary energy consumption, making it one of the worlds leading producers.
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of countries or blocks of countries. This is an important scenario to consider since
certain types of transboundary pollutants, in reality, damage a few neighbouring
countries/regions. For example, consider the pollution of lakes that are surrounded
by a few countries each with their independent emission strategies (see, for example,
Bayramoglu (2006) which studies the pollution of the Black Sea which a¤ects Roma-
nia and Ukraine), or consider the pollution of the Great Lakes by Canada and the US
which eventually led to the Great Lakes Water Quality Act and Clean Water Act in
the 1970s).2 Another scenario where this setting gains relevance lies within the con-
text of climate change. In recent international negotiations over climate change (for
example, at the UNFCCC COP Meetings at Copenhagen, 2009, and Cancun, 2010),
only a small number of large countries or blocks of countries (e.g. US, China, and
EU) dominated discussions and played a decisive role in determining the outcomes.
When the negotiations over emissions of transboundary pollutants involve a small
number of countries, each country internalizes the e¤ect of its own decisions on the
outcome in terms of the stability of the coalition in question and in terms of emission
and welfare levels. In order to model the behaviour of countries within such a context
in line with reality, we must allow each country to behave strategically in relation to
others when deciding whether to participate in or defect from coalitions and when
deciding how much to emit. For this reason, we use a game theoretic approach to
modeling transboundary pollution where all countries rst decide whether to be a
signatory to an IEA and then simultaneously choose their individual emission strate-
2Note that in this paper, for simplicity, we abstract away from the extreme case where the
eutrophication of the lake causes irreversible damage, refered to in the literature as the "shallow
lake" problem.
3
gies. Moreover, the fact that we focus on a small number of countries/regions a¤ects
our choice of stability criteria for the possible coalitions that may arise amongst
them, as follows.
Much of the IEA literature uses the internal and external stability criteria as
described by dAspremont et al (1983) and applied to the context of IEAs by Barrett
(1994), Carraro and Siniscalco (1993), Diamantoudi and Sartzetakis (2006), Hoel and
Schneider (1997) and others. These criteria rely on the restrictive assumption that
if one country defects from a given coalition, the rest of the members of the coali-
tion continue to participate in the IEA. The general conclusion of much of the IEA
literature is that only small coalitions (of size 2 or 3) can be stable (see for example,
Barrett, 1994 and 2003; Diamantoudi and Sartzetakis, 2006; Finus, 2003). However
if only small coalitions form, the assumption that a player does not take into account
the impact of its decision to leave a coalition on the decision of the other coalition
members to remain in the coalition is more di¢ cult to justify. Therefore, we use
an alternative set of stability criteria refered to in the literature as "farsightedness"
under which when a country contemplates leaving an IEA, it takes into account the
repercussions on other countriesadhesion to the IEA.3 See Diamantoudi and Sartze-
takis (2002) and Eyckmans (2003) for the application of the farsightedness concept
in IEAs in a static framework and de Zeeuw (2008) in a dynamic framework.4 When
3Farsightedness is a stability concept that lies in the middle of two extremes that have been
used in the previous literature on IEAs. On the one hand, internal and external stability assumes
that when one country defects, the rest of the coalition remains intact. On the other extreme, the
gamma-core stability concept of cooperative game theory assumes that when one country defects,
the rest of the coalition completely disintegrates. See Ray and Vohra (2001) and Chwe (1994) for
a detailed discussion of farsightedness in coalition formation games.
4De Zeeuw (2008) takes into account the dynamics of emissions adjustments and shows that
large and small coalitions occur only if the cost of emissions is relatively small compared to the cost
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a small group of large players are involved, it seems that countries are indeed far-
sighted when making their decisions. For example, when the US refused to ratify
the Kyoto protocol, its stated reason was that other countries (especially the large
developing countries like China and India) would not behave cooperatively if the US
committed to reducing its emissions. E¤ectively, the US chose not to join the IEA
because it anticipated other countries to defect if it joined, which is an application
of the concept of farsightedness.5
We show that if countries use the farsighted criterion for deciding whether to
defect from a coalition, the grand coalition, which is farsighted stable in the presence
of a su¢ ciently dirty technology, may be destabilized by the implementation of a
cleaner technology that reduces the emissions per output ratio, ultimately resulting
in higher global emissions and lower global welfare.
We rst derive this result within a static model, and then generalize it to a
dynamic model which allows the pollutant to accumulate over time. This is an
important step in the analysis since several transboundary pollutants are also accu-
mulative such as greenhouse gases in the atmosphere and phosphorus in lakes. The
dynamic framework allows us to examine the impact of a change in the natural rate
of decay of the stock pollutants on the stability of an IEA. Also, it is an interest-
ing extension from a theoretical perspective since Benchekroun and Ray Chaudhuri
(2011) and van der Ploeg and de Zeeuw (1992) show that countriesfree riding in-
of abatement.
5The United States signed the Protocol on November 12, 1998. However, the Clinton Ad-
ministration did not submit the Protocol to the Senate, since one of the conditions passed
in mid-1997, meaningful participation by developing countries in binding commitments limit-
ing greenhouse gases, had not been met. (see the Encyclopedea of Earth for further details:
http://www.eoearth.org/article/Kyoto_Protocol_and_the_United_States)
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centives are exacerbated when their emission decisions are functions of the stock of
pollution. Benchekroun and Ray Chaudhuri (2011), using a similar setting to this
paper, show that in the dynamic case it is more likely that countries may respond to
a cleaner technology by increasing their equilibrium emissions to an extent such that
the stock of pollution increases and welfare decreases. A priori, it is unclear whether
the free-riding incentives of countries regarding IEAs as derived in the static case
carry over to the dynamic case.
For the dynamic setting, we use the seminal transboundary pollution game model
in Dockner and Long (1993) and van der Ploeg and de Zeeuw (1992). In contrast
with van der Ploeg and de Zeeuw (1992) and Jorgensen and Zaccour (2001), we have
taken the ratio of emissions to output as exogenously given. Van der Ploeg and de
Zeeuw (1992) (section 8) and Jorgensen and Zaccour (2001) consider the case where
the ratio of emissions to output is endogenous and is a decreasing function of the level
of the stock of clean technology. While van der Ploeg and de Zeeuw (1992) assume
that the stock of clean technology is public knowledge, Jorgensen and Zaccour (2001)
consider the case where the stock of clean technology, also referred to as the stock
of abatement capital, is country specic. Each country can invest in the abatement
capital in addition to its control of emissions.6
Rubio and Casino (2005) study the stability of IEAs using a di¤erential game
setting similar to ours. They use the internal and external stability criteria and
6Van der Ploeg and de Zeeuw (1992) compare the outcome under international policy coordi-
nation and the open loop equilibrium when there is no coordination. They show that the level of
production and the stock of clean technology are both higher under the non-cooperative equilibrium.
Jorgensen and Zaccour (2001) consider an asymmetric game where there exist two regions facing
a pure downstream problem. They design a transfer scheme that induces the cooperative levels of
abatement and satises overall individual rationality for both regions.
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show that the two country coalition is the unique stable coalition. Rubio and Ulph
(2007) also study IEAs in the presence of stock pollutants. They allow countries
to decide each period whether they wish to participate in the IEA and investigate
whether a large coalition can be stable in the steady state. Breton, Sbragia and
Zaccour (2010) also model IEAs in a dynamic setting. They consider the formation
of an IEA in an international pollution game where signatory countries are assumed
to be able to punish the non-signatories at a cost. They propose an evolutionary
process through which countries may gradually reach a stable agreement. They
adopt a replicator dynamics, under which evolutionary pressures are put in favor of
the group (signatories versus non-signatories) obtaining the highest payo¤. None of
these papers analyze the impact of technology changes and the role of the stock of
pollution on the stability of IEAs.
We start our analysis within a standard static model of a transboundary pollution
game and then show that our main results carry over to the dynamic context. We
further use the dynamic framework to show that the higher the stock of pollution,
the more likely that the implementation of clean technologies destabilizes the grand
coalition, thus reducing (and possibly reversing) the benets of implementing cleaner
technologies. Also, within the dynamic context, there arises an alternate type of
measure that countries may engage in to counter pollution: one that increases the
rate of natural absorption of the stock of pollution such as reforestation. This type
of measure is shown to have a similar impact on the stability of IEAs as reducing
the emission per output ratio.
Section 2 presents the basic model. Section 3 presents the analysis for the static
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scenario where pollution damage depends on the current emission levels. Section 4
presents the analysis for the dynamic scenario where the pollution damage depends
on the stock of pollution. Section 5 presents the concluding remarks.
2 The Model
Consider n countries indexed by i = 1; :::; n: Each country produces a single con-
sumption good, i. Production generates pollution emissions. Let "i denote country
is emissions of pollution. We have:
"i = i (1)
where  is an exogenous parameter that represents each countrys ratio of emissions
to output. The implementation of a cleaner technology is represented by a fall in :
The instantaneous net benets of country i = 1; ::; n are given by
bi (i) = Ui (i) Di (:) (2)
where Di (:) represents the pollution damage that is a by-product of the production
process, and
Ui (i) = Ai  
B
2
2i ; A > 0
We consider two scenarios. In the rst, the pollution damage faced by each
country, Di (:) ; is a function of total emissions of all the countries. This is the static
version of the model, as presented in the following section. We then analyze the
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scenario where emissions are allowed to accumulate into a stock of pollution over
time and the pollution damage faced by each country, Di (:) ; is a function of this
pollution stock. This is the dynamic version of the model, as presented in Section 4.
3 The Static Model







2; s > 0. (3)
We begin by studying the equilibria under non-cooperation and full cooperation.
We then analyze coalition formation in the following subsection.
The non-cooperative equilibrium
The objective of country is government is to choose a production strategy, qi (or
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Full Cooperation
The objective of country is government is to choose a production strategy, qi (or
equivalently a pollution control strategy), that maximizes the joint net benets from
























Consider the scenario where the countries decide to form an international environ-
mental agreement. More specically, let M  N countries sign an agreement while
NnM do not. We denote the size of coalitionM by m and the total output produced
by the coalition by Qm = mqm, where qm is the output of a representative signatory.
Similarly, Qnm = (n   m)qnm is the total output produced by the complement of
the coalition with qnm being the output produced by a representative non-signatory.
The sum of the output of the signatory and non-signatory countries, that is global
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output, is given by Q = Qm +Qnm:
We assume that the nonsignatories behave noncooperatively and the signatories
maximize the joint welfare of the members of the coalition. The coalition and the
nonsignatories are assumed to choose their emission strategies simultaneously.















; i 2 NnM; j 2M (5)
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This results in the following best response function of the nonsignatories:
A Bqi   s2
 





By symmetry, we have
A Bqnm   s2 ((n m) qnm +mqm) = 0 (6)
The best response function of the signatories is given by:
A Bqj  ms2
 






By symmetry, we have:
A Bqm  ms2 ((n m) qnm +mqm) = 0 (7)
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We note that qm > 0 i¤
 <  
s
B
s (m  1) (n m)
We also note that if m = 0; we have qnm = q
nc





the total output be given by Q  mqm + (n m) qnm:
The welfare of each signatory country, at the equilibrium, is given by:







The welfare of each non-signatory country, at the equilibrium, is given by:







Global welfare under a coalition of size m; given a total of n countries is denoted by
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W m;n:
W m;n = mw

m + (n m)wnm
Much of the IEA literature uses the internal and external stability criteria as de-
scribed by dAspremont et al (1983) which assumes that if one country defects from
a given coalition, the rest of the members of the coalition continue to participate
in the IEA. Under such stability criteria the general conclusion of much of the IEA
literature is that only small coalitions (of size 2 or 3) can be stable (see for exam-
ple, Barrett, 1994 and 2003; Diamantoudi and Sartzetakis, 2006). Moreover, small
coalitions achieve sizable gains in welfare compared to non-cooperation only when
the number of players is small. However for small coalitions and number of players,
the assumption that a player does not take into account the impact of its decision
to leave a coalition on the decision of the other coalition members to remain in the
coalition is more di¢ cult to justify. Therefore, we use an alternative set of stability
criteria referred to in the literature as "farsightedness" under which when a country
considers leaving an IEA, it takes into account the implications on other countries
adhesion to the IEA. We analyze the stability of coalitions using the farsighted sta-
bility concept as used by Eyckmans (2003), Diamantoudi and Sartzetakis (2006),
Osmani and Tol (2009) and de Zeeuw (2008) in the context of environmental agree-
ments. In this paper, we shall focus on the case of a small number of players because
we believe that it is in those situations where the assumption of farsightedness seems
most realistic. Henceforth, for simplicity, we focus on the case where n = 3, and
analyze how the stability of the grand coalition (made of three players) is a¤ected
by technology changes. The paper highlights certain possible results and therefore,
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we consider the simplest case where the possible outcomes of interest arise.
We proceed in two steps: rst, we analyze the stability of the two country sub-
coalition and then we proceed to analyze the stability of the grand coalition. For
the purpose of our analysis, it is useful to dene the stability function, which is
represented by the following:
i (m) = w

m (m)  wnm (m  1) : (10)
Two country coalition
When i (2)  0 neither coalition member has an incentive to leave the coalition
(assuming the third country does not join the coalition). Moreover, when i (3) < 0;
the third country does not have an incentive to join the coalition (assuming the other
two coalition members remain in the coalition).
Remark: Note that for the case of 3 countries, the farsighted stability crite-
rion is closely related to the internal and external stability criteria as presented by
dAspremont et al (1983). The grand coalition of size 3 is farsighted stable if and
only if a coalition of size 2 is internally unstable.















coalition of size two is farsighted stable if   ms:








it can be shown that














































is, for values of  that are su¢ ciently low. Thus, implementing a cleaner technology
may stabilize the IEA of size 2.















In this simple model the coalition structure is dependent on the level of the tech-
























That is, as  decreases, qm and q

nm both increase. This is because the implementation
of the cleaner technology reduces the damage from production at the margin, giving
each country an incentive to increase its output. The rate of increase in emissions of
each signatory country in response to cleaner technology is higher than that of the
non-signatory. Thus, as the cleaner technologies are implemented, it becomes less
costly to stay inside the coalition of size two in terms of sacriced production.
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Grand coalition
In the case of 3 countries, when say country 1 contemplates leaving the grand coali-
tion, it compares its payo¤ under the grand coalition to its payo¤ if countries 2 and
3 form a coalition or to its payo¤when countries 2 and 3 break up as well, depending
on country 2 and 3s incentives to continue forming a coalition. Since the decision
of country 2 and 3 to form a coalition depends on the level of technology, as per
Proposition 1, we have the following.
Proposition 2: The grand coalition is farsighted stable for  > ms:
When  is above ms, if say country 1 contemplates leaving the grand coalition
it will compare its payo¤ under the grand coalition to the payo¤ under the non-
cooperative outcome since for  > ms the coalition that contains country 2 and 3
only is (internally) unstable. Therefore, for  above ms; country 1 will opt to remain
in the grand coalition. The same reasoning applies to countries 2 and 3. When  is
below ms, if say country 1 contemplates leaving the grand coalition it will compare
its payo¤ under the grand coalition to the payo¤ under the outcome where countries
2 and 3 continue to form a coalition since for  < ms the coalition that contains
countries 2 and 3 is stable.
In this case, the equilibrium level of total emissions under a (farsighted) stable









Figure 2: Global emissions as a function of θ
3
1
We have an upward discontinuity of the level of welfare under a (farsighted) stable







Figure 3: Global welfare as a function of θ
1.5
1
An important implication of this analysis is that, under the farsighted stable
coalition criterion, a decrease in the emissions per output ratio from 0 > ms to
00 < ms can have a negative impact on world welfare since it breaks down the
sustainability of the grand coalition (which is stable under 0 and unstable under
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00). In Figure 3, for example, the global welfare drops by more than 45% by going
from the grand coalition to the coalition with two members.
4 The Dynamic Model
In this section, we extend our analysis to the dynamic case where the emissions are
allowed to accumulate into a stock over time and pollution damage is a function of
this stock.
Emissions of pollution accumulate into a stock, P (t) ; according to the following
transition equation:
_P (t) = ni=1"i (t)  kP (t) (11)
with
P (0) = P0 (12)
where k > 0 represents the rate at which the stock of pollution decays naturally.7
For notational convenience, the time argument, t; is generally omitted throughout
the paper although it is understood that all variables may be time dependent.
The damage function of country i = 1; ::; n is given by:
Di (P ) =
s
2
P 2; s > 0. (13)
We begin by studying the equilibria under non-cooperation and full cooperation.
We then analyze coalition formation in the following subsection.
7For n = 2 and 1 = 2 = 1; our model is equivalent to Dockner and Long (1993).
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4.1 The Markov perfect equilibrium
The objective of country is government is to choose a production strategy, qi (t) (or
equivalently a pollution control strategy), that maximizes the discounted stream of
net benets from consumption, denoted by i (t):




e rtbi (i (t) ; P (t)) dt (14)
subject to the accumulation equation (11) and the initial condition (12). The dis-
count rate, r; is assumed to be constant and identical for all countries. We dene
below a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of this n-player di¤erential game.
Countries use Markovian strategies: i (:) = qi (P; :) with i = 1; :::; n. The n-tuple
(q1; :::; q

n) is a Markov Perfect Nash equilibrium, MPNE, if for each i 2 f1; :::; ng,
fi (t)g = fqi (P (t) ; t)g is an optimal control path of the problem (14) given that
j (:) = q

j (P; :) for j 2 f1; :::; ng ; j 6= i.
In the following section, we analyze the case where countries are identical, that is
1 = :: = n = : In this case, such a game admits a unique linear equilibrium and a
continuum of equilibria with non-linear strategies (Dockner and Long (1993)). The
linear equilibrium is globally dened and, therefore, qualies as a Markov perfect
equilibrium. The non-linear equilibria are typically locally dened, i.e. over a subset
of the state space. We focus in this analysis on the linear strategies equilibrium. Since
our contribution is to highlight an a priori unexpected outcome from the adoption
of a cleanertechnology, we wish to make sure that our result is not driven by the
fact that countries are using highly sophisticatedstrategies.
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Proposition 3: The vector (q; ::; q)
qi (P ) = q (P ) 
1
B
(A     P ), i = 1; ::; n (15)
constitutes a Markov perfect linear equilibrium and discounted net welfare is given
by
Wi (P ) =  
1
2






B (2k + r)2 + (2n  1) 4s2

  (2k + r)B
2 (2n  1) 2
 =
An
B (k + r) + (2n  1)2
 =  (A  ) (A  (2n  1) )
2Br





is globally asymptotically stable.
Proof: We use the undetermined coe¢ cient technique (see Dockner et al (2000)
Chapter 4) to derive the linear Markov perfect equilibrium. The details are omitted.
(See Proposition 1 of Dockner and Long (1993) for the case where  = 1). 
We note that qi > 0 i¤ P < P ()  1 (A  ) : It is straightforward to show
that P () > PSS () for all   0:
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4.2 Full Cooperation
The objective of country is government is to choose a production strategy, qi (t)
(or equivalently a pollution control strategy), that maximizes the joint discounted





wi (i (t) ; P (t))
subject to the accumulation equation (11) and the initial condition (12).
Proposition 4: The vector (qc; ::; qc)
qci (P ) = qc (P ) 
1
B
(A  c   cP ), i = 1; ::; n (18)
constitutes the fully cooperative equilibrium and joint discounted welfare of all coun-
tries is given by































The steady state level of pollution
P cSS () =
(k + r) nA 
Bkr +Bk2 + n2s2
 > 0 (20)
is globally asymptotically stable.
Proof: We use the undetermined coe¢ cient technique (see Dockner et al (2000)
Chapter 4) to derive the fully cooperative equilibrium. The details are omitted. (See
Proposition 1 of Dockner and Long (1993) for the case where n = 2 and  = 1). 
4.3 Coalition Formation
The coalition formation game remains the same as in the static model in the previous
section.
The nonsignatoriesmaximization problem is given by (4) subject to the accumu-
lation equation (11) and the initial condition (12) and the signatories maximization
problem is given by:
max
qi
Wm (P ) =
mX
i=1
wi (i (t) ; P (t)) ; i 2M
subject to the accumulation equation (11) and the initial condition (12).
Let signatoriesjoint value function be




2   mP   m (21)
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Let each nonsignatorys value function be




2   nmP   nm (22)
In (21) and (22) ; m; m; m; nm; nm and nm are functions of the parameters
of the model. They are derived using the same methodology as used to derive
Propositions 3-4, using (23) and (24) as given below.
The signatoriesproduction strategies satisfy the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equa-
tion as given by:













P 2 +W 0m (P ) [
n
i=1qi   kP ]

(23)
Each non-signatorys production strategies satises the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman
equation as given by:











P 2 +W 0nm (P ) [
n
i=1qi   kP ]

(24)
Due to the asymmetric nature of the game between the signatories and non-
signatories, the expression for the stability function is cumbersome. Therefore, we
proceed with a numerical example that illustrates the main results. To construct
the numerical example we use parameter values as used by List and Mason (2001)
to illustrate the case of greenhouse gas emissions by US states. We set r = 4%8;
8This value of the discount rate is in line with that used by Nordhaus in his climate change
models.
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k = 0:01, B = 2 = 1 and s 2 f0:003063; 0:15315; 0:000613g : For these parameter
values, the example is identical to the benchmark case of List and Mason (2001). We
then vary  and k to study the impact of cleaner technologies.
4.4 The e¤ect of clean technologies on IEAs
We rst show that results qualitatively similar to those reported by Proposition 1
for the static case carry over to the dynamic context.
As in the static case, the grand coalition is internally unstable in this example, as
illustrated by Figure 4, which also implies that the two-country coalition is externally
stable.
θ
Figure 4: Internal stability of grand coalition as a function of θ at P = 0
Ф (3)









Figure 5 is similar to Figure 1 and illustrates a result similar to Proposition
1. Ceteris paribus, if  decreases to a level below a certain threshold due to the
implementation of a cleaner technology, a two-country coalition becomes stable. The
intuition behind this result is also similar to the static case: each coalition members
output is more elastic with respect to  than the non-members output at a given P:
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This is illustrated by examining the emission strategies as functions of P:
Figure 5 further illustrates that the threshold in terms of  is decreasing in s:
That is, the higher the damage parameter, the lower the range of  such that the
two-country coaliton is stable.
Figures 6-7 show that the cleaner technology reduces the gap between the emission
strategies of the members and non-members. This reduces the cost of remaining
in the two-country coalition and explains why the two country coalition becomes






















Figure 7: Emission strategies at θ = 1 as P varies
As in the static case, as long as the two-country coalition is stable, the grand
coalition is unstable by the farsightedness criterion. This has an optimistic impli-
cation: the higher the damage parameter, the greater the range of  for which the
grand coalition is stable by the farsightedness criterion at a given P . That is, the
grand coalition is more likely to be stable by the farsightedness criterion when the
gains from cooperating on emission reduction are high, given dirtier the technologies
and more damaging pollutants. It follows that the disintegration of the grand coali-
tion can be costly. Figure 5 illustrates the global welfare as a function of  under
the grand coalition, the two-country coalition and the non-cooperative equilibrium
for s = 0:003063: As per Figure 4, the two-country coalition becomes stable at the
threshold value of  given by  = 0:874: As Figure 8 illustrates, at  = 0:874; going
from the grand coalition to the two-country coalition decreases global welfare by
around 295%.
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Within a dynamic context, one of the factors that inuences the stability of
coalitions is the stock of pollution at the instant when the decision about whether
to join or leave the coalition is made. Figure 9 shows that the higher the stock, the
more likely that the two-country coalition is stable, and consequently, the less likely
that the grand coalition is stable.












Figure 10 shows  (2) as a function of P at  = 1 and  = 0:3: Starting at P = 0;
suppose  falls from 1 to 0.3 due to the implementation of a clean technology. At
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 = 1; the two-country coalition is internally unstable. However, the reduction in 
makes this coalition stable. Moreover, as shown by Figure 10, as the stock rises in
transition to the new steady state, the stability function increases. The higher the
stock, the greater the incentive of the two members to remain in the coalition. Thus,
once the grand coalition disintegrates, it remains disintegrated forever after.
Figure 10: Internal stability of 2-country IEA as a function of P at s = 0.003063
P
Ф (2)







Ф (2)|θ = 0.30
Ф (2)|θ = 1
Next, we examine how a change in k; the natural rate of absorption, a¤ects
the stability of coalitions. One example of actively increasing k is reforestation.
According to Canadell and Raupach (2008), terrestrial ecosystems remove nearly 3
billion tons of anthropogenic carbon every year, absorbing about 30% of all CO2
emissions from fossil fuel burning and net deforestation. China has used 24 Mha of
new forest plantations and natural forest regrowth to o¤set 21% of Chinese fossil fuel
emissions in 2000. Another example of increasing k is ocean nourishment which is a
type of geoengineering based on introducing nutrients to the upper ocean to increase
marine food production (phytoplankton) and to sequester carbon dioxide from the
atmosphere.
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The grand coalition is not internally stable for the range of k shown in Figure
11, implying that the two country coalition is externally stable: As shown by Figure
11, an increase in k beyond a threshold, renders the two-country coalition internally
stable. This also implies that investing in technologies that increase k may destabilize
the grand coalition. The higher the damage parameter, the higher the threshold of






Figure 11: Internal stability of 2-country IEA as a function of k at P = 0
As Figure 12 illustrates, going from the grand coalition to the two-country coalition
decreases global welfare by around 305%.
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This paper shows that, if countries are farsighted when deciding whether to defect
from a coalition, then the implementation of cleaner technologies may jeopardize the
chances of reaching an international environmental agreement. We showed, both
analytically within a static framework and using a numerical example within a dy-
namic framework, that implementing clean technologies may destabilize an otherwise
stable grand coalition when countries are farsighted. We considered a reduction the
emission per output ratio as well as measures that enhance the natural rate of decay
of stock pollutants. We showed that the higher the stock of pollution, the more
likely that the above mechanism unfolds. We would like to note that this analysis
highlights a possibility result and should not be taken as a general wisdom. While it
contains a rather pessimistic message, it should viewed more as a warning against the
perception that technology improvement is the panacea to all the major transbound-
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ary pollution problems than a recommendation to discourage the implementation of
cleaner technologies.
The main policy recommendation that can be drawn from this analysis is that,
greener production processes or measures to enhance natures capacity to clean the
environment do not necessarily eliminate the need to agree on environmental poli-
cies with appropriate transfers across regions to reach self-sustainable and successful
environmental agreements (see e.g., Germain et al. (2003) or Petrosjan and Zaccour
(2003) for the case of the design of transfers in dynamic transboundary pollution
games). For each particular transboundary pollution problem, a specic analysis
taking into account the number, size and behavior of players (farsighted or myopic)
when contemplating the ratication of an agreement is necessary before one can
determine what role cleaner technologies may play in reaching an agreement.
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